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Editorial Introduction 
ANUP PAHARI AND MARK TURIN 
 
As editors of this issue, it was our original intention to come out 
with a special ‘Nepal issue’ of PDSA which would cover a broad 
range of relevant issues related to the current impasse in Nepal. 
Due to a limited number of quality academic submissions, 
however, we have been obliged to scale back our plans somewhat 
and settle instead for an issue with a ‘Focus on Nepal’. We do hope 
that, in the near future, and with sufficient lead time, we will be 
able to solicit enough Nepal-related articles to qualify for a special 
issue in its own right. 
In the present issue, we have a number of impressive 
articles with Nepal focus. We start with an article by the respected 
historian John Whelpton who offers some structured reflections on 
the causes and effects of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Being 
both well-versed in the machinations of contemporary Nepali 
politics, and yet sober in his judgements, his article makes for an 
interesting and comparative read. Next, Amanda Snellinger’s 
paper offers a compelling analysis of an apparent crisis in student 
politics. In her ethnographically rich presentation, she focuses on 
the gap between politically active and non-active students and 
demonstrates that this is symptom of a larger political problem: the 
disconnection of the political parties with their support base in the 
general population who are their constituents. Finally, Bandana 
Shrestha and Som Niroula offer an informative research note on 
internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in Nepal, contrasting the 
international legal provisions for such citizens with the inability 
and unwillingness of the government of Nepal to take their plight 
seriously.  
In their paper titled ‘The Naga Resistance Movement and 
the Peace Process in Northeast India’ the authors C. J. Thomas and 
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H. Srikanth focus on the oldest insurgency in northeast India, and 
suggest that the ongoing peace talks between the government of 
India and the Naga insurgent group NSCN (IM) leadership have 
raised considerable hope for peace in the region. The authors argue 
that the chances of arriving at a sustainable peace proposal are 
bright at this time given a change in international political scenario 
and the recent shifts in Indian foreign policy that is beginning to 
look at the region as a resource rather than a liability. The paper 
emphasizes the need for a pragmatic approach to the contentious 
issues of sovereignty, unity and problems of integration of Naga 
inhabited areas so that the negotiating parties are able to arrive at 
an agreement that will be acceptable to all the stakeholders in the 
region.   
In his paper ‘Techno-Industrial Cooperation for 
Development in the Two Punjabs and Strategic Role of the Punjabi 
Diaspora’, Lakhwinder Singh offers a basis for techno-industrial 
cooperation between the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs in order to 
reduce knowledge gaps. Singh argues for close techno-industrial 
cooperation between the governments of the two Punjabs both in 
the fields of industry and education and proposes that the two 
Punjab governments should work hard to initiate an enduring 
process of establishing high-tech research institutions. The other 
paper on the two Punjabs is by Tridivesh Singh Maini, who argues 
how economic integration between India and Pakistan in general 
and the two Punjabs in particular will surely prove to be beneficial 
to both the countries but more so for India, whose strategic location 
is yet to be exploited due to narrow security and political 
considerations. One of the most important stumbling blocs in this 
regard is the Kashmir issue, which the author argues, must be kept 
in the back burner if the two countries have to take advantage of 
the new economic opportunities that globalization offers to them. 
Maini notes several positive developments in this direction and 
hopes that one day the two countries will learn to overcome their 
political handicaps. 
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The above distribution of articles is also reflected in the 
book reviews included here, although not by design. The book 
reviews by Deepak Thapa, Manaslu Gurung & Chris Holme, and 
Sara Shneiderman deal with three recent and important 
publications on Nepal by John Whelpton, Manjushree Thapa and 
the Centre for Investigative Journalism. The other two reviews deal 
with books that discuss Indo-Pak relations. Michelle Cooksley 
reviews the book on cricket by Shaharyar K. Khan and Justin Jones 
reviews the book on Pakistan by Stephen Cohen, but the two books 
are tied together with a common appreciation for better 
relationship between India and Pakistan.   
While heading towards publication, we realised that while 
the three research articles and the three book reviews covered 
important aspects of the current socio-political and humanitarian 
situation of Nepal, the focus of the issue would be rather limited in 
the absence of any analysis of the royal takeover of February 1, 
2005, its impact on the various parties in the conflict and on the 
nature of the conflict itself. Thus, instead of writing a more 
traditional editorial overview, we thought it desirable and 
necessary to use our editorial prerogative to highlight the royal 
coup of February 1st and its tactical and strategic implications. We 
do so in the belief that the royal takeover earlier this year, and the 
major shifts and alignments in Nepali society and politics which it 
has brought about, will play a decisive role in reshaping the nature 
of the current conflict in Nepal and the timing and direction of its 
resolution in the near future. 
Thirty years of single-party monarchical rule ended in 
Nepal in April 1990, amid great fanfare and public expectation. A 
decade and half later, constitutionalism and stable parliamentary 
democratic politics continue to elude Nepal. Successive rounds of 
post-1990 national politics have foundered on a bed of unresolved 
historical animosity. State, society, community, and economy in 
Nepal are caught in seemingly endless and multiple conflicts. 
Today Nepal stands at a perplexing and perverse distance from the 
heyday of democratic consensus of the early 1990s, when even 
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sceptics had to accept that perhaps the transition to truly 
representative democracy had been successfully made in Nepal. 
Yet, the past decade and a half has seen a virtual political 
meltdown in Nepal with the country in the throes of a low 
intensity civil war, and the polity convulsing thanks to social, 
ideological and political polarisation reminiscent of states both in 
paralysis and heading unsteadily towards collapse. 
In many parts of rural Nepal the armed Maoist insurgency 
has systematically phased out the little state presence that had been 
negotiated through five decades of ‘development.’ From the Maoist 
perspective, fully rooting out the ‘state’ included uprooting the 
uneven yet precocious and well accepted presence of the 
constitutional political parties in the rural parts of the country. As 
part of their revolutionary critique and practice, the Maoists offer a 
vision of a Nepal in which social, political, and economic 
institutions and relations are re-engineered in keeping with their 
normative belief in a truly socialist utopia. Backed by arms, and 
operating in a terrain ideal for guerrilla war, the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Maoist) has succeeded in deploying violence to advance 
their political cause beyond the limits which would have been 
possible for a political party using non-violent parliamentary 
means. 
However, even critics of the Maoists who abhor their role in 
normalising violence in Nepali politics are forced to acknowledge 
that no organized political group had exposed the conditions of 
widespread marginality in Nepal, or espoused the cause to address 
such marginality, as effectively as have the Maoists. While coercion 
and violence have played a central role in catapulting the Maoists 
from a marginal left party to a formidable national armed rebel 
movement, it is also quite clear that they command a share of 
popular support among a nationwide constituency of Nepalis 
disenfranchised and exploited for generations. 
Whether the Maoists are considered to be a political party 
first and a ‘terrorist’ outfit second, or vice versa, the insurgency has 
brought the entire edifice of post-1990 democratic politics to a 
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standstill. The last national and local elections in the country were 
held in 1999, and the last parliament was dissolved in October 
2002. Elected local bodies across the country were dissolved by 
Prime Minister Deuba shortly before he was himself removed by 
King Gyanendra who did so by invoking Article 127 of Nepal’s 
constitution. Political party activists and officials have left their 
rural bases in droves (Nepal is 70% rural by population, and over 
90% rural by land area), causing the presence of the mainstream 
parties in rural Nepal to sink to a historic low point, perhaps even 
lower than during the latter half of the Panchayat period. 
NGOs and the activism and development space which they 
created and in which they operated after 1990 has rapidly shrunk 
as the NGOs themselves and the people that staff them face 
conditions that make safe and effective operation in Nepal’s rural 
villages close to impossible. With both security forces and Maoists 
monitoring their work, the fourth estate, Nepal’s free press, has 
been under particular duress across Nepal since the start of the 
insurgency. Following King Gyanendra’s formal takeover of 
February 1, 2005, the royal government has gone after the media in 
open defiance of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech 
and expression. The royal government has not spared NGOs and 
INGOs from a slew of recently instituted arbitrary regulations 
aimed at weakening their capacity to put pressure on the state on 
grounds of human and civil rights, and freedoms. 
The monarchy and multi-party democracy, long considered 
‘twin pillars’ of the Nepali state, are in the process of battering each 
other into submission, if not oblivion. The rift between the palace 
and parties has progressively widened since the royal takeover, 
and the gulf now seems almost unbridgeable until a new 
constitutional and political dispensation can be worked out. How 
this will come about is a subject of intense interest and speculation 
at present, and is certain to have very far-reaching consequences 
for state and society in Nepal. 
Even prior to February 1, 2005, the three sides involved in 
the conflict in Nepal – monarchy, Maoists, and political parties – 
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were already separated by significant ideological and political 
differences. February 1st has had the effect of further distancing 
the monarchy and the army from the political parties, while the 
distance between the latter and the Maoists, at least at face value, 
appears to have narrowed. However, there is no glossing over the 
fact that leading up to February 1st, the mainstream political 
parties were very much part of the state structure which the 
Maoists aimed and intended to topple. Indeed, aside from their 
common opposition to the royal power grab of February 1st, 
profound differences exist between the Maoists and the 
mainstream parties on substantive issues of governance. 
Political and ideological polarisation in Nepal has reached a 
new high since direct royal rule, and the monarchy — an 
institution whose legitimacy was already in some jeopardy after 
the 2001 palace massacre — has painted itself into a corner. The 
King and his court will now have to depend for survival almost 
entirely on the active support of the old, anti-democratic 
aristocracy, and the Royal Nepal Army, the institutional base of the 
traditional Nepali ruling classes. February 1st eliminated the buffer 
that political parties provided for constitutional monarchy as 
enshrined in the 1991 Constitution. As a result, King Gyanendra 
has exposed the monarchy to a barrage of domestic and 
international attacks with no parliament and elected government to 
temper and deflect the onslaught. Faith in the coexistence of 
democracy and monarchy in Nepal has been shattered for many 
political party faithful and members of civil society. Not 
surprisingly, the Maoists’ call for a republican state has gained 
considerable momentum among the political parties and even 
among ordinary citizens. 
The royal takeover of earlier this year has yielded both a 
possibility and a predicament for the constitutional political 
parties. The outright breach of the contract between the palace and 
the political parties represented by the takeover has forced the 
parties, after years of infighting, to unite under a common banner 
(the ‘7-party alliance’) and to launch a movement for ‘full 
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democracy.’ With press freedom and civil liberties under direct 
assault after February 1st, the seven-party alliance has received 
catalytic support from ‘civil society’ groups comprising of 
academics, journalists, lawyers, writers and other professionals 
who find themselves at the forefront of resisting the state’s 
draconian measures. The united front of the political parties, with 
backing from ordinary citizens, is in the process of recovering some 
of the political capital which it squandered since 1990 through 
inter- and intra-party infighting and mis-governance. In this sense 
then, the royal takeover has provided political parties with a 
significant opportunity to reclaim lost legitimacy among the 
masses. 
However, with the February 1st move also come 
predicaments for the constitutional parties of Nepal. With 
relatively little public goodwill to rely on after a decade in power, 
the parties are obliged to adopt the language and modality of ‘civil 
society’ in the process of building a resistance and mass protest 
against the royal takeover. The ‘civil society’ movement is itself 
predicated on two key ideas. First, that owing to the compromised 
approach of the constitutional parties when both in and out of 
office, political power in Nepal had migrated back to the palace. 
Secondly, that this shift of power back to the palace was inevitable 
given the ‘compromised’ nature of the 1991 Constitution which left 
large loopholes for the palace to exploit. In this line of argument, 
the royal takeover of February 1st, 2005, was seen as direct result of 
the ‘incompleteness’ of democracy in Nepal based on its 
constitution a decade and a half earlier. 
The remedy on which the political parties have settled is 
defined around the pursuit of ‘complete’ (also referred to as ‘full’ 
or ‘absolute’) democracy. After the initial assertion of royal power 
in October 2004, ‘complete’ democracy was defined around 
strategies to contain and check monarch intent upon being ‘seen as 
well as heard.’ The revival of the dissolved House of 
Representatives became a rallying cry for the Nepali Congress and 
its veteran leader, Girija Prasad Koirala. Reinstating the house, 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii
then, would become the first step to achieving ‘complete’ 
democracy. 
After the first of February 2005, the 7-Party Alliance 
adopted the slogan of ‘complete democracy’, even though its 
political goal was no longer restricted to the revival of the 
Parliament. Instead, responding to the strongly anti-party platform 
through which the King justified his royal takeover, the 7-Party 
Alliance migrated steadily towards the position that the only way 
to achieve ‘complete’ democracy in Nepal was to adopt a 
democratic and republican political set up through the 
implementation of a constituent assembly. The Communist Party 
of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML) and the Nepali Congress 
Party (NC) soon passed internal party resolutions formalising, to 
various degrees, their party’s disillusionment with constitutional 
monarchy in Nepal. 
‘Civil society’ played a significant role in the post-February 
1st radicalization of the 7-Party Alliance, as did younger party 
activists. Both ‘civil society’ and political party activists hold covert 
and overt palace interference since 1950 to be primarily responsible 
for the failure of democracy in Nepal to grow deep roots, to gain 
stability and to meet public expectations. Thus, post-February 1st, a 
three-way convergence of views between the political party 
leaders, ‘civil society’, and radicalised younger party activists has 
emerged about the root causes of the instability of democracy in 
Nepal, and its long-term redress. The Shah monarchy’s long-
standing reluctance to be bound within the constitution is now 
widely regarded as the fundamental factor behind weak and 
ineffectual democracy in Nepal. The growing calls for a 
‘democratic republic,’ therefore, represent the experiences and 
conclusions of pro-democracy Nepalis distilled through 60 years of 
struggle against an ‘activist monarchy.’ 
Interestingly, the post-February 1st ferment and 
introspection within the political parties has led them to the same 
practical conclusions that the Maoists have held for a decade, 
namely that people’s sovereignty and monarchy in Nepal cannot 
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co-exist. Based on this conclusion, political parties in Nepal (again, 
not unlike the Maoists) have embraced a constitutional assembly 
and a ‘democratic republic’ as the definite nikas (outlet or solution) 
for the nation. This means that the long-standing tri-polar conflict 
in Nepal is now less tri-polar and increasingly bi-polar – the 
monarchy and army versus a potentially united force of political 
parties, ‘civil society’ and the Maoists. Can this mean that Nepal is 
now closer to peace, stability and democracy? 
The answer would be affirmative if the political parties are 
able to successfully bring about any one of the three critical 
conditions outlined below: 
a) A sustained and sizeable demonstration of public support 
for the 7-party and ‘civil society’-led peaceful movement 
which could turn the tide decisively in favour of the 
agitating party coalition and against the palace and its 
supporters, including the Royal Nepal Army.  
b) A major realignment in the loyalty of the Royal Nepal 
Army from exclusive support of the palace to actively 
backing the parliamentary forces that could potentially end 
not only the royal regime, but the institution of the 
monarchy itself. 
c) A credible commitment by the Maoists to lay down arms, to 
renounce violent politics, and enter into the mainstream as 
one of Nepal’s many parties in a multi-party democratic 
setup, which might quickly de-legitimise the royal regime 
both domestically and internationally. 
While condition `a’ (amassing sustained public support for a 
movement) is the most feasible of the three for the parties to 
implement, the experience of the past three years reveals that this 
would be easier said than done. In over three years of nearly 
continuous street agitations, political parties admit that they have 
had limited success in bringing masses other than party cadre and 
student supporters to the streets. Numerically, crowds have grown 
larger with ‘civil society’ participation. Yet the combined mass 
strength of the movement, so far, falls short of the numbers needed 
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to counter the coercive presence of the state and to carry the 
agitating parties to their stated political goal of a democratic 
republic. The movement may gain strength if the Maoists join the 
demonstrations peacefully. But condition `c’, discussed below, has 
to be met for that to happen. 
Under the present power alignments, the probability that 
the political parties will be able to bring about condition `b’ is 
arguably the most remote among the three conditions outlined 
above. To understand why, one needs only examine the relative 
impact of the insurgency on the parties and on the monarchy and 
the military. 
While the insurgency has arrested or reversed the presence, 
power and reach of parliamentary forces all across Nepal, it has 
had the perverse effect of laying the groundwork for the 
resurgence of an activist monarchy with the backing of a greatly 
beefed up security apparatus. While the insurgency has decimated 
(in physical ways in some cases) the numerical and moral strength 
of the parliamentary forces in the hinterlands, it has contributed to 
a massive growth in the numbers and capabilities of the Royal 
Nepal Army (RNA) and the police force. While the insurgency, 
until recently, created multiple rifts within and between the 
political parties, it has helped to draw the palace and the army 
closer together for reasons of survival if nothing else.  
In the face of a determined insurgency aimed directly 
against the monarchy and the military, the palace and the army 
have closed ranks. Both institutions, and in particular the military, 
have developed a persecution complex based on their perception 
that the Maoists, the political parties, ‘civil society’, human rights 
NGOs and INGOs, and the press are out to ‘get’ them. The window 
of opportunity that opened briefly from 1991 until 2001 for the 
development of a good working relationship between the new 
Nepali political elite (the parties) and the RNA (the traditional 
elite) rapidly closed as the insurgency heated up and took on a 
national character. While there are certainly liberal and democratic 
minded officers among the younger generation in the army ranks, 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi
the sense of being under siege from all sides has created an 
environment where liberal leanings are superseded and 
suppressed by the institutional survival instinct of the military. 
Hence, rather than fraying under pressure, the RNA has allied 
itself ever more closely with its traditional ally and patron, the 
monarchy. 
 In the last few weeks, the realisation of condition `c’ seems 
to have gone from remote possibility to imminent probability. 
Before discussing the likelihood of condition `c’, it is important to 
briefly review the impact, to date, of the Maoist insurgency on the 
constitutional political forces that are represented under the 1991 
Constitution. The post-1990 Nepali state comprised of two major 
constitutional actors – the parliamentary political forces and the 
constitutional monarchy. The Maoist insurgency was conceived as 
an ideological and political attack on both elements of the post-
1990 state. But the actual and immediate impact of the Maoist 
insurgency on the two constitutional forces has been uneven. In the 
past ten years, then, the Maoist insurgency has disproportionately 
weakened the parliamentary forces in Nepal compared to its real 
impact on the palace, monarchy and the security forces. 
Despite this legacy, after February 1st and, in particular, 
after the Maoist’s unilateral ceasefire, political parties have been 
under pressure from their cadre and from ‘civil society’ activists to 
forge an alliance with the Maoists against the current royal regime. 
The unilateral ceasefire and some recent public statements by key 
Maoist leaders are offered as evidence that the Maoists are fully 
ready for a ‘soft landing’ as a parliamentary political party. 
Stonewalled by the king, political party leaders are currently in the 
process of engaging with the Maoists both inside and outside of 
Nepal. It is equally clear that the Maoists are eager to build a 
coalition with the parties, now that the parties have shown 
themselves to be more open than ever to the two key goals of the 
Maoists – constituent assembly, and the establishment of a 
‘republic.’ But there are a number of factors which would indicate 
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that bringing the Maoists into the mainstream is not going to be a 
simple or easy process. 
First, the insurgency is a movement comprising of tens of 
thousands of individuals organized into armed political cells 
spread throughout Nepal. The real test of the parties’ ability to 
bring the Maoists into multi-party parliamentary democracy will 
be played out in the countryside where armed Maoist political 
cadre have held sway since 1996. So far, the situation in the 
countryside is not one where parties might exercise the prerogative 
of making room for the Maoists. To the contrary, the situation on 
the ground is one where organised and armed local Maoists are in 
the driving seat: they are in a position to decide whether, when, 
and how much space will be ceded to the parties. It is up to the 
local Maoist cadre to allow parties to revive their political and 
organizational presence in areas where they have been 
institutionally inactive for up to a decade. These stark realities of 
the current architecture of power in the countryside, rather than 
symbolic overtures between top leadership of the Maoists and the 
parties, will decide whether or not the Maoists will enter the 
parliamentary mainstream. 
Second, for the best part of a decade, the leaders of the 
insurgency have preached the language of ‘capture of total state 
power’ to their cadre and militias. Eventually agreeing to come 
within the fold of parliamentary democracy has not figured 
prominently in Maoist rhetoric or practice at any level. The Maoist 
insurgency has been about deploying violence to implode the post-
1990 Nepali political ‘mainstream,’ not about ‘joining’ it under 
terms offered by the parliamentary parties. These are the standard 
expectations on which Maoist cadres have been raised and retained 
since their battle began. These expectations may well prove to be 
insurmountable barriers against the Maoists entering into the 
parliamentary mainstream in any ordinary understanding of that 
concept. 
Lastly, party collaboration with the Maoists to revive 
democracy in Nepal is a proposal filled with landmines for the 
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parties. Tactical or strategic, if the alliance between the parties and 
Maoists does achieve its goal of a democratic republic, successfully 
managing the key contingencies arising in the ensuing political 
void may well overwhelm the structural capacity of the parties to 
keep the country from getting bogged down in yet another 
indefinite and destructive power struggle. For whatever reason, if 
the proposed party-Maoist alliance fails, the monarchy and its 
allies in Nepal, which includes a military of nearly 100,000, may 
exploit the attempted merger to further marginalize political 
parties. In either case, there is a clear danger that the political 
parties will back themselves into an impossible corner in the 
process of trying to negotiate this potentially Faustian political 
bargain. 
There is an argument that the percolation of the three-way 
conflict in Nepal into an increasingly two-way conflict might 
render the impasse more amenable to a final settlement in favour 
of democracy. However, for reasons outlined above, a bi-polar 
conflict will not necessarily help to resolve the political impasse. 
Much depends on whether a provisional agreement ends up 
painting the protagonists into even more irreconcilable corners, or 
whether it changes the terms and dynamics of the conflict in such a 
way as to galvanize national politics decisively in favour of liberal 
multi-party democracy. 
In the latest developments, the political party-Maoist 
alliance seems to be coming to a head with India assuming a large 
role in hammering out an agreement between the two. Initial 
reports coming out of New Delhi hint at the possibility that the 
Maoists have agreed to the major demands put forth by the parties 
before an agreement can be signed between them. On the part of 
the Maoists, these include a commitment towards multi-party 
democracy, an agreement not to direct violence against the parties 
and their cadres, and the laying down of arms under UN auspices. 
The parties, for their part, have apparently agreed to not work with 
the king, to reject elections called for by the king, and to endorse 
elections to a constituent assembly. 
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The expectation of the political parties from this possible 
agreement with the Maoists is that it will enlarge and galvanize 
nationwide protest and opposition against the King’s February 1st 
takeover. Furthermore, they will hope that the provisional 
agreement will neutralize the armed threat posed by the Maoists in 
return for helping them make a ‘soft landing’ back into the political 
mainstream. The political parties hope to retain most of their pre-
insurgency electoral clout and a presence in the new parliament 
commensurate with their pre-insurgency election results. 
On the part of the Maoists, if we hope for a moment that 
this is not a tactical move reminiscent of Mao’s classic ‘united front’ 
(i.e., unite with lesser enemy to deal with greater enemy), the 
Delhi-brokered deal with the parties can be expected to help them 
accomplish several of their aims. First and foremost, the alliance 
with the parties promises to legitimize the Maoists as a ‘normal’ 
political party, while simultaneously further de-legitimizing the 
monarchy in national, regional and international contexts. Second, 
the alliance makes elections for a ‘constitutional assembly,’ a core 
Maoist demand, a near inevitable outcome of a successful party-
Maoist joint political movement against the monarchy. Third, the 
Maoists expect to find a respectable outlet for their armed fighters, 
whether this be through re-entry into civilian life or through 
individual transfers into a future national army and police. And, 
lastly, the Maoists may even expect to have a realistic shot at 
forming a national government by winning elections held under 
the new constitution. 
But the push for Maoist-parties alliance runs into real 
practical difficulties in the heartlands of Nepal where the conflict 
has taken on an intractable character in which local political 
conflict has life and death implications. In the past few weeks, a 
sizeable contingency of UML cadre and activists descended upon 
the UML party headquarters in Kathmandu to question the top 
party leadership about the nature and extent of UML’s investment 
in forging an alliance with the Maoists. A portion of this concern is 
based on cadre perception that the top UML leadership was 
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rushing into a strategic relationship with the Maoists without 
extracting the requisite concessions from them on issues that have 
a direct bearing on the safety and security of political party work 
and workers in the districts, towns and villages of Nepal. The 
predicament of the constitutional party cadre operating in the rural 
areas is aptly captured in the following line spoken by a Nepali 
Congress activist from Arghakhanchi District: ‘Maoist words are 
directed against the King and palace, but their actions are directed 
against the party cadres’ (Himal Khabarpatrika, vol. 15, # 14, Nov. 2-
15, 2005: 28). 
Hence, alongside the party leadership’s determination to 
reach out to the Maoists in order to build a robust movement 
against royal autocracy, there is deep and abiding distrust of the 
Maoists among rural party cadre, the organizational backbone of 
the parties. While the Maoist ceasefire has lowered fatalities 
sharply, its inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement has done little 
to inspire the confidence of rural party workers who continue to 
live and work only by accepting and accommodating the dictates 
of the local Maoist commanders. 
Assuming that the Maoists adopt multi-party democracy as 
their only strategic goal, there are three circumstances under which 
the party-Maoist alliance can lead quickly to peace and democracy 
in Nepal. First, if India (or any other major player) can extract tacit 
approval from the King for the ‘soft landing’ that India and the 
Nepali political parties are extending to the Maoists in return for 
their demilitarised participation in the mainstream. Second, this 
may also happen if the party-Maoist alliance is successful in 
transforming the nature of the domestic political equation in the 
direction of galvanizing a massive and sustained national 
movement for democracy which receives immediate international 
endorsement. And finally, peace and democracy may result if the 
King and the RNA, faced with a direct popular and internationally-
supported threat to their existence, quickly agree to fully abide by 
a constitution drafted by an assembly of elected constituents. 
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Alternatively, there are three circumstances under which 
the party-Maoist coalition will lead to greater violence, less 
democracy, and likely more autocracy. 
First, if the Maoists use the alliance with the parties as a 
mere tactical advantage, then, even if a powerful popular 
movement succeeds in neutralizing or unseating the King, major 
violence and renewed conflict is a certainty in the ensuing struggle 
to fill the power vacuum. In this situation, power can only migrate 
to the Maoists, or to a military dictator, rather than to the political 
parties who would advocate the restoration of democratic order. 
Second, if the Maoist-party alliance does indeed spark a 
powerful popular movement, which the King and the RNA decide 
to face down and repress with force, the situation may descend 
into full-blown civil war where Nepalis can expect to witness 
unpredictable and unprecedented levels of violence with no 
guarantee that democracy will win out in the end. 
Lastly, if for whatever reason, the party-Maoist alliance 
does not succeed in generating a powerful and sustained 
nationwide movement in its favour, the King and the various 
forces supporting active monarchy in Nepal will have no incentive 
to rehabilitate the parties, the Maoists, or democracy in the short 
run. In this scenario, violence will remain endemic, but limited to 
pockets and the future for liberty, democracy and respect for 
human rights in Nepal will be bleak. In this scenario, with the 
political parties gravely weakened and entirely sidelined in the 
process of affecting a dramatic political shift in the country through 
an alliance with the Maoists, it will take years to rebuild the 
democratic middle ground in Nepal. 
For all the trauma that it has brought to democracy and 
civil liberties in Nepal over the past ten months, the King’s 
February 1st move may yet turn out to be the catalyst that starts 
the process which will ultimately heal Nepali society, the body 
politic, and a national psyche sustained only by its yearning for 
peace. 
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Note 
This editorial was written prior to the November 22nd announcement of the 12-
point agreement between the 7-party alliance and the CPN (Maoist). However, the 
editors have opted not to revisit the editorial before publication. This decision is 
based primarily on an understanding that the original editorial discussion 
anticipates and analyses at length many of the more significant contingencies 
raised by the ‘12-point agreement’ between the 7-party alliance and the CPN 
(Maoists). 
 
